Introduction
The present paper aims to examine the effect of a firm's corporate governance (CG) mechanisms on the number of analysts following UK firms. It also examines the potential impact of analysts following UK firms on the association between CG mechanisms and firm value. The study uses the agency theory to examine these associations.
Based on the agency theory, the existence of high quality CG mechanisms should mitigate the agency costs in the relation between the principal (shareholders) and their agents (managers) (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . High quality CG mechanisms are highly valued by the stock market. For example, prior research finds that CG is a key determinant for firm valuation (Lang et al, 2003) , cost of equity (Bowen et al, 2006) , market liquidity (Roulstone, 2003) and firms 'credit ratings (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al (2006) .
Another stream of literature studies on the usefulness of CG mechanisms to the stock market tend to focus on financial analysts. This is because financial analysts are widely considered to be a very influential user group in stock markets. They represent and influence investors' believes and activities (e.g., Schipper, 1991; Hirst et al., 1995; and Lang and Lundholm, 1996) . This line of research finds that CG affects the accuracy of analyst forecasts (Bhat et al, 2006 and Byard et al, 2006) ; the number of analysts following firms and firm value (Lang et al., 2004; Haw et al., 2004; Yu, 2007 and Boubaker and Labegorre, 2008 ). On the current study, we extend this line of literature by examining the association between corporate governance, analyst following and firm value in the UK.
The first version of the UK Corporate Governance Code was introduced by the Cadbury Committee In 1992; its paragraph 2.5 is still the classic definition of the context of the Code (FRC, 2010) : "Corporate governance is the system by which companies are directed and controlled.
Boards of directors are responsible for the governance of their companies. The shareholders' role in governance is to appoint the directors and the auditors and to satisfy themselves that an appropriate governance structure is in place. The responsibilities of the board include setting the company's strategic aims, providing the leadership to put them into effect, supervising the management of the business and reporting to shareholders on their stewardship. The board's actions are subject to laws, regulations and the shareholders in general meeting".
The present paper utilizes the unique UK regulatory framework in which it combines high standards of corporate governance with relatively low associated costs (FRC, 2006) . In addition, it is argued that the UK outperforms other countries in terms of governance standards, while compliance costs are estimated to be lower in the UK compared to other countries with comparable standard (FRC, 2006) . This context enables the present study to contribute to existing corporate governance research by examining whether corporate governance mechanisms affect analyst following and firm value.
This research is important for its potential policy implications. It helps to inform regulators (and managers) about the benefits of improving the quality of corporate governance mechanisms to firms. In this way it provides part of the information needed for a more cost-benefit analysis of the use of different corporate governance mechanisms by UK firms. We test to see if levels of corporate asymmetric information (measured by the number of analysts following UK firms) can be reduced through corporate governance mechanisms.
We also test the joint effect of both corporate governance mechanisms and the number of analysts following on UK firm value.
Analyst following is considered as one of the most important determinants of corporate valuation (i.e., Claessens et al, 2002; Lang et al, 2003) , the cost of equity capital (i.e., Bowen et al., 2008) , market liquidity (i.e., Attig, et al. 2006) , and dividend payment decision (i.e., Basiddiq and Hussainey, 2010) . In addition, prior research finds that firms with high quality corporate governance mechanisms are more likely to be followed by a large number of financial analysts and that higher analyst following is associated with higher valuation for firms facing governance problems (Lang et al, 2004) . Lang et al (2004) is the first to study the association between corporate governance, analyst following and firm value in the UK. Their analysis was focus on a sample of 638 firms with financial year ends on 1996. However, they did not examine a full set of corporate governance mechanisms.
Another stream of research in the UK examines the association between corporate governance and corporate voluntary disclosure (i.e. Hussainey and Al-Najjar, 2010; Hussainey and Wang, 2010; Li, et al, 2008) . However, these studies use the level of corporate disclosure as a proxy for the number of financial analysts following UK firms. In addition, they limit their analysis to a subset of corporate governance mechanisms.
In the present paper, we respond to a recent call for research that explains the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on analyst following for a longer time period and larger sample size (Yu, 2010) . In particular, we investigate whether firms that possess strong internal and external corporate governance mechanisms have better capital market performance as a result of more analysts' following and better firm value relative to firms with weak corporate governance mechanisms. We contribute to corporate governance research by offering new evidence on the association between corporate governance, analyst following and firm value for a large sample of UK firms. An important feature of this paper is that it uses data of the largest corporate governance data provider to institutional investors, Corporate Governance Quotient (CGQ) offered by RiskMetrics Group. This database contains 55 CGQ governance factors which span eight categories of corporate governance including board, compensation, takeover and audit. We use an overall measure of corporate governance quality score as well as individual sub-scores to examine which CGQ governance factors are significantly associated with analyst following and firm value for UK firms.
Using a sample of 1514 UK listed firms; we find that there is a positive association between the quality of overall corporate governance mechanisms and the number of financial analysts covering UK firms. This suggests that financial analysts have greater incentives to follow better-governed UK firms. However, we find that not all corporate governance mechanisms affect analyst following. In particular, we find that compensation mechanism is the only significant variable in all regression models. In addition, following Lang et al. (2004) we use a regression model that takes into account the endogeneity between analyst following and firm value. However, we find no valuation effect when financial analysts cover UK firms with good corporate governance mechanisms. This suggests that financial analysts serve as a monitoring device and act as substitute mechanism for corporate governance when valuing firms.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews relevant literature and develops our research hypotheses. Section 3 describes data and the sample selection. Section 4 describes the research design. Section 5 presents the empirical results. Section 6 concludes and suggests lines for further research.
Relevant Literature and Hypotheses

Analyst following and corporate governance
There are three reasons why quality of corporate governance may affect the number of analysts following the company. First of all, Fan and Wong (2002) and Willekens et al. (2005) argue that firms tend to disclose a better quality information if they implement effective corporate governance mechanisms. This will consequently reduce the cost for an analyst to follow such firms. Second, firms with effective corporate governance mechanisms are more able to directly monitor their managers, which in turn, align the managers' interests with the shareholders' interests and reduce the agency problem arising from the separation of ownership.
Third, McNichols and O'Brien (1997) argue that analysts allocate their efforts on the basis of their expectations of the firm's future performance and they are inclined to add firms they view favourably. Klapper and Love (2004) and Durnev and Kim (2005) suggest that analysts prefer to follow better-governed firms because they are associated with better management, and hence better future economic viability. For the above three reasons, we expect a positive association between the number of analyst following and the quality of corporate governance. Our first hypothesis is stated as follows:
Analyst following is positively associated with the quality of corporate governance.
Analyst following, corporate governance and firm value
There is an important role for financial analysts in conveying firms' performance to If the number of analyst following plays a disciplinary role on misbehaving managers and rewards value creation, the presence of internal governance mechanisms should lower the marginal benefit of more analyst following, and vice versa. Hence, we anticipate a negative joint impact of analyst following and corporate governance on valuation. Our second hypothesis is stated as follows:
The relation between the quality of corporate governance and valuation is less pronounced for firms with greater analyst following than for firms with lower analyst following. FactSet Research Systems Inc., which provides analytics to investment professionals to download, combine, and manipulate financial data for insight into global market including UK stock market. We merge the analyst following data with corporate governance data using companies' Sedol numbers. We merge 2852 firm-year observations for the number of analyst following with 2514 firm-year observations from QCG using Sedol numbers. This leads to an initial sample of 1577 firm-year observations.
Data and Sample
To test hypothesis H 1 , we use the natural logarithm of total assets as a proxy for firm size. We collect total assets from Worldscope (item no. WC02999). We remove firms with missing total assets data, this ends up with a sample of 1514 firm-year observations (see Panel A in Table 2 ).
To test hypothesis H 2 , we collect accounting data from Worldscope. In particular, we calculate Tobin's Q as total assets (Worldscope item WC02999) less the book value of equity (Worldscope item WC05476) multiplied by the number of shares outstanding plus the market value of equity (MV) divided by total assets. We use Total debt (Worldscope item WC03255) to compute total Debt/total Assets ratio (DA) and Capital expenditure (Worldscope item WC04601) to compute Capital expenditure/Total Assets ratio (CA). We remove firms with missing accounting data, this leads to a sample of 1505 firm-year observations (see Panel B in Table 2 ).
Insert Table 2 here
Research Design
Models employed to test H 1
To test H 1, we employ the following model:
Following is defined as the number of analysts following UK firms collected from FactSet dataset.
CG is the aggregated CG ranking provided by CGQ.
Size is the natural logarithm of total assets CGQ also provides sub-scores for each firm in four particular governance areas; board, takeover defences, executive and director compensation and ownership, and audit.
These subs-cores are expressed in numbers from 1-5 (5 indicates firm in the top quintile in a governance area while 1 indicates firm is in the bottom quintile in a governance area).
In order to understand which of these components better explains the number of analyst following, we run model (1) We control for firm size in the above three models using the natural logarithm of total assets (in £ millions). Based on prior literature (e.g., Lang et al. 2003 Lang et al. , 2004 , we expect a positive sign for Size.
Models employed to test H 2
With a slight modification to Lang et al. (2004) to accommodate corporate governance variables, we run the following regression model:
Tobin's Q is used to proxy for the market valuation of assets and is computed as total assets less the book value of equity plus the market value of equity divided by total assets. CG is measured by the corporate governance ranking published by QCG. Analyst following (Following) is defined as in equation (1).
In model 4, we use three control variables. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets.
Size is expected to be positively related to Tobin's Q. To control for the possibility that creditors are able to lessen managerial agency problems or that debt provides valuable tax shields, we use the ratio of total debts to total assets (DA). We control for firm's potential investment opportunities using the ratio of capital expenditure to total assets (CA). We expect both DA and CA to have a positive sign (Lang et al., 2004) .
We use another variable, (NCG), as a proxy for the quality of corporate governance which is the sum of the four dimensions (Board, Following, Compensation, and Audit), and we re-run the following new model:
We further partition NCG into its components and use each of this component one at a time instead of NCG in equation (5), to examine which of these components has more impact on firm value. The results are reported in columns (7-13) of Table 8 . We expect these components to have a positive impact on firm value. Based on hypothesis H 2 , we expect the coefficients of both d 3 and h 3 to be negative and significant. Table 3 provides summary statistics of the variables used in the regression models.
Empirical Results
Analyst following and corporate governance
The number of analyst following ranges from the minimum of 0 to the maximum of 43 with a median of 9 which indicates that 50% of firms have less than 9 analysts following. The Corporate governance ranking (CG) has a high average of 85.664 and a median of 87.8 which shows that majority of firms in the sample are of high corporate governance quality which is expected given that all firms in CGQ are included in MSCI EAFE index. The second measure of corporate governance (NCG) ranges from 6 to 20 with a median of 18 which again confirms the lower cross sectional variation in corporate governance quality due to sample bias to high quality corporate governance firms. The four sub-scores of corporate governance ranges from 1 to 5 with a median of 5 for Board, Takeover, and Audit and a median of 4 for compensation. This indicates a higher level of cross sectional variation in Compensation compared to the three remaining components of corporate governance.
Insert Table 3 here Table 4 shows the correlation coefficients between the variables used in the regression models (1, 2 and 3). It can be noticed that there are significant relationship between all the variables in the regression models apart from the relationship between Compensation and both Takeover and Size.
Insert Table 4 here   Tables 5 & 6 show the empirical results related to hypothesis 1. Table 5 reports the results without using year dummies; while Table 6 Table 5 are consistent with the correlation analysis in Table 4 . Insert Table 7 here Table 8 provides the correlation coefficients among the variables. First, CG is positively associated with Tobin's Q while is NCG is negatively associated with Tobin's Q and the same applies for its four components apart from Audit. Size and DA are the only variables with significant relation with Tobin's Q.
Insert Table 8 here Column 2 in Table 9 shows that CG and Following come with the expected positive sign but insignificant coefficients. This positive relationship is consistent with Lang et al. (11) and (13) are similar. In the models without interaction terms (in unreported results), Following has a significant impact on firm valuation but of the wrong sign (negative). Moreover, Size is the only variable that is persistently significant in all models. Table 9 provides empirical test on the conjecture that the positive market valuation effect of corporate governance is conditional on the number of analyst following. The results in column (2) and (4) support H 2. As expected, the interaction term CGFollowing and NCGFollowing has a negative coefficient but it is insignificant. This is inconsistent with Yu (2007) who find positive but still insignificant coefficient.
Insert Table 9 here
Conclusion
Our paper builds on literature that investigates the link between corporate governance, analysts following and firm value. We extend this work in four important ways.
First, we investigate the association between corporate governance mechanisms and the number of analysts following UK firms. In particular, we examine the extent to which better corporate governance quality attracts more financial analysts for covering UK firms. Second, we try to identify which component of corporate governance is more likely to affect analysts following. Third, we test the joint effect of corporate governance mechanisms and analysts following on UK firm value. Finally, we study the effect of different corporate governance sub-categories on firm value in the presence of analysts following.
The paper uses a sample of 1514 UK firms listed in London Stock Exchange. It finds that the overall level of corporate governance quality is positively associated with the number of analysts following UK firms. Among the four individual components of corporate governance, we find that compensation score seems to be the main component that affects analyst following. Our paper also shows that both better corporate governance quality and greater analyst following have no significant effect in enhancing UK firm value. Our results add to the understanding of the expected role of financial analysts as additional monitoring mechanism in the stock market.
An interesting issue for future work would be to examine the extent to which the quality of corporate governance mechanisms affect financial analysts' stock recommendations (i.e. buy, sell or hold) and their earnings forecasts accuracy. In addition, it is worth to investigate the extent to which financial analysts actually use corporate governance information in reports. Using a content analysis approach, researchers can identify which CG mechanisms are reported in analysts reports and the extent to which these mechanisms are important for the stock market participants (i.e. current and future investors). 
